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CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS IN THE 
DIGITAL ERA: LESSONS FROM  
ICELAND AND IRELAND 
SILVIA SUTEU* 
Abstract: Mechanisms of constitutional development have recently attracted 
significant attention, specifically, instances where popular involvement was 
central to the constitutional change. Examples include attempts by British Co-
lumbia, the Netherlands, and Ontario at electoral reform, in addition to the 
more sweeping reforms sought in Iceland and Ireland. Each of these coun-
tries’ attempts exemplifies varied innovative avenues to reform involving par-
ticipatory and partially citizen-led processes aimed at revitalizing politics. The 
little legal scholarship on these developments has provided an insufficient an-
alytical account of such novel approaches to constitution-making. This Essay 
seeks to build upon the current descriptive work on constitutional conventions 
by focusing on the cases of Iceland and Ireland. The Essay further aims to 
evaluate whether the means undertaken by each country translates into novel-
ty at a more substantive level, namely, the quality of the process and legitima-
cy of the end product. The Essay proposes standards of direct democratic en-
gagements that adequately fit these new developments and further identifies 
lessons for participatory constitution-making processes in the digital twenty-
first century. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mechanisms of constitutional change have gained renewed interest in 
recent years. The Arab Spring and its associated constitution-making pro-
cesses is perhaps the most visible manifestation of this.1 Other examples 
include the Scottish and Catalonian independence movements, as well as 
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 1 See generally 2013 Working Paper Series: Consolidating the Arab Spring: Constitutional 
Transition in Egypt and Tunisia, INT’L IDEA & CENTER FOR CONST. TRANSITIONS N.Y.U. L. 
(Zaid Al-Ali & Richard Stacey eds., 2013). 
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the problematic adoption of a new constitution and subsequent amendments 
in Hungary. 2 Situations wherein popular involvement was central to ad-
vancement of the process have likewise attracted significant attention; such 
attempts include British Columbia, the Netherlands, and Ontario’s electoral 
reforms, in addition to the more sweeping reforms sought in Iceland and 
Ireland.3 All of these cases creatively experimented with whereby participa-
tory, partially citizen-led processes intent on revitalizing politics were at the 
heart of the desired constitutional change.4 
 Curiosity in how new technology and social media has increasingly 
influenced various stages of the constitution-making process has renewed 
interest in such initiatives.5 Iceland and Ireland are often hailed as trailblaz-
ers in marrying technology and direct democracy in their respective consti-
tutional reform processes.6 Iceland’s constitution is widely recognized as 
the world’s “first crowd-sourced constitution.” 7  Ireland’s constitution is 
likewise acknowledged as a paradigm of transparency and inclusiveness.8 
The potential reinvigoration of popular participation in political decision-
making via citizen-focused constitutional conventions is another reason for 
optimism.9 Consequently, ordinary citizens have been permitted to partici-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See, e.g., Stephen Tierney, Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for 
Scotland, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 359, 360 (2013). See generally Miklós Bánkuti et al., Hungary’s 
Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 138 (2012).  
 3 See, e.g., David M. Farrell, The Irish Constitutional Convention: A Bold Step or a Damp 
Squib? in 75 YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND: AN IRISH–ITALIAN DIALOGUE 191, 195 
(John O’Dowd & Giuseppe Ferrari eds., 2013); PATRICK FOURNIER ET AL., WHEN CITIZENS DE-
CIDE: LESSONS FROM CITIZEN ASSEMBLIES ON ELECTORAL REFORM 28 (2011); Hélène Lan-
demore, Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment, J. POL. PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2014) 
at 1, 9, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jopp.12032/epdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/232E-DU9M. 
 4 See Farrell, supra note 3, at 200 (arguing that the aim of the Irish Constitutional Convention 
was to re-engage with demos); FOURNIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 27–28 (discussing formation of 
citizen assemblies in Ontario, British Columbia, and the Netherlands); Farrell et al., Deliberative 
Democracy in Action Irish-Style: The 2011 We the Citizens Pilot Citizens’ Assembly, 28 IRISH 
POL. STUD. 99, 100 (2013) (discussing the impetus for creating the Pilot Citizens Assembly as 
voter apathy); Landemore, supra note 3, at 3. 
 5 See, e.g., Landemore, supra note 3, at 9 (describing the use of Facebook, Twitter, and email 
for feedback in Iceland).  
 6 See Landemore, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing Iceland); Iseult Honohan, What Can the UK 
Learn from the Irish Constitutional Convention?, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.
opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/iseult-honohan/what-can-uk-learn-from-irish-constitutional-
convention, archived at https://perma.cc/8XFD-VZ5C (discussing Ireland). 
 7 See Landemore, supra note 3, at 17. 
 8 See Matthew Wall, Column: Change We Can Believe In? Ireland’s Constitutional Convention 
Has Delivered, JOURNAL (July 23, 2013), http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-change-we-can-
believe-in-ireland%E2%80%99s-constitutional-convention-has-delivered-1003278-Jul2013/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8YDA-LT45. 
 9 See Landemore, supra note 3, at 3. 
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pate in an arena traditionally reserved to lawyers and politicians: constitu-
tion-making.10 
Legal scholarship has not yet analyzed these developments sufficient-
ly, thereby providing an inadequate account of such novel approaches to 
constitution-making. Iceland’s case, for example, may not be replicable due 
to the peculiar characteristics of that country, including its small size and 
homogenous population.11 Ireland is likewise open to similar objections, 
and given the piecemeal nature of its reform process, might be criticized for 
a lack of ambition.12 
There is an acute need for a comprehensive account of new forms of 
popular participation in constitutional conventions, not least given their re-
newed popular appeal. The Scottish Government, for instance, leading up to 
its independence referendum on September 18, 2014, indicated its expecta-
tion of calling a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting the 
new country’s constitutional text.13 The United Kingdom’s (UK) Political 
and Constitutional Reform Parliamentary Committee published a report in 
March 2013 entitled “Do we need a constitutional convention for the UK?” 
which asked whether there was a need to employ such a convention for de-
ciding the union’s future.14 Proposals for a UK-wide constitutional conven-
tion have not abated since the Scottish referendum, rather, there have been 
additional calls for exploring the possibility of a crowdsourced UK constitu-
tion have manifested.15 Accordingly, constitutional conventions need to be 
reassessed in light of their digital era incarnation.  
This Essay assesses whether the novelty in the means used in modern 
constitution-making translates further into novelty at a more substantive 
level, namely, in the quality of the constitution-making process and legiti-
macy of the end product. Additionally, this Essay analyzes standards of di-
rect democratic engagements, which adequately fit these new develop-
ments, with a focus on the cases of Iceland and Ireland.  
This Essay first asks why differing forms of constitution-making 
should be examined. Part I explains the importance of constitutional legiti-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See id. at 1–2. 
 11 See id. at 3. 
 12 See Farrell, supra note 3, at 197–98. 
 13 See SCOTTISH GOV’T, SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE BILL: A CONSULTATION ON AN INTERIM 
CONSTITUTION FOR SCOTLAND 5 (June 2014), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/
0045/00452762.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M9WZ-7L5R.  
 14 See POL. & CONST. REFORM COMMITTEE, DO WE NEED A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
FOR THE UK?, 2012–13, at 5 (House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Ltd., 2013). 
 15 See Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, For a Constitutional Convention for the United Kingdom, UK 
CONST. L. ASS’N (Sept. 22, 2014), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/09/22/cormac-mac-amhlaigh-
for-a-constitutional-convention-for-the-united-kingdom/, archived at http://perma.cc/C2LB-YNH5; 
Constitution UK: Introduction, LONDON SCH. ECON., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/constitutionuk/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5KQB-65NW. 
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macy, content, longevity, and democratic theory. Part II addresses constitu-
tional conventions as one mechanism for facilitating constitutional change. 
Part III analyzes the Icelandic and Irish constitutional convention experi-
ences and proposes a set of lessons to be drawn from them. Additionally, 
Part III proposes a set of principles to evaluate constitutional convention 
success from the standpoint of participatory and deliberative democracy. 
Finally, this Essay concludes with an account of the deeper significance of 
constitution-making processes to underlying theories of constitutional de-
sign, legitimacy, and ultimate success.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Does Participatory Constitution-Making Matter? 
There are four fundamental reasons why the processes of constitution–
making should be observed in greater depth.  
1. Constitutional Legitimacy 
Constitutional legitimacy depends on a series of factors.16 The process 
of its creation, however, is often most central.17 Two common features typi-
fy 21st century legitimacy in constitution-making: popular participation and 
emphasis on process.18 
The first common feature in modern constitution-making is the notion of 
popular participation.19 This concept has recently emerged due to a contem-
porary, near “universal acceptance that the authority for a Constitution must 
derive . . . from the people of the state concerned.”20 Scholars have identified 
a broad trend “towards openness, inclusivity and the active involvement of 
the people of a state at all stages of the process through participation, rather 
than mere consultation.” 21  Inclusive and open processes of constitutional 
change provide greater weight to principles of self-government and public 
political engagement.22 In the Icelandic context, for instance, scholars viewed 
the process as clearly evincing an “idea of self-governance and a perception 
of constitutionalism, which understands civic participation as a necessity in 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Cheryl Saunders, Constitution Making in the 21st Century, 4 INT’L REV. L. 2, 3 (2012). 
 17 See id. at 3.  
 18 Id. at 2–3.  
 19 See id.  
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. at 9; see also Claude Klein & András Sajó, Constitution-Making: Process and Sub-
stance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 435, 436 (Michel 
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
 22 See Saunders, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing public participation creating a sense of public 
ownership). 
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order for a constitution to become a vibrant reflection of a political communi-
ty’s political imagery and self-understanding.”23 
The second common feature is the emphasis placed on process: 
Process can underpin the legitimacy of a Constitution, increase 
public knowledge of it, instill a sense of public ownership and 
create an expectation that the Constitution will be observed, in 
spirit as well as form. A constitution–making process may assist 
to set the tone for ordinary politics, including the peaceful trans-
fer of power in accordance with constitutional rules.24 
In other words, there is an educational element involved in having a “good” 
constitution-making process because it can serve as model for subsequent 
political interactions. 25 There is also a link to public ownership and in-
creased vigilance because an informed public will know when the constitu-
tion has been transgressed and demand accountability.26 Interestingly, this 
was discussed in the context of the Irish constitutional reform process, 
which demonstrated the broader point that constitution-building should 
begin with the reform process itself.27 
2. Constitutional Content 
A possible link exists between participatory constitution-making and 
increases in the number of mechanisms for popular involvement included in 
new or revised constitutions.28 A study testing this notion has found that 
more inclusive constitutional moments lead to more democratic politics, 
additional constraints on government authority, and to stronger, more dura-
ble constitutions.29 The study confirmed that “the content of constitutions 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Baldvin Thor Bergsson & Paul Blokker, The Constitutional Experiment in Iceland, in VER-
FASSUNGGEBUNG IN KONSOLIDIERTEN DEMOKRATIEN: NEUBEGINN ODER VERFALL EINES 
POLITISCHEN SYSTEMS? 154, 159–60 (Kalman Pocza ed., 2014) (article published in English). 
 24 Saunders, supra note 16, at 3. 
 25 See id.  
 26 See Jennifer Widner, Constitution-Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, 49 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1513, 1519 (2007). 
 27 See STEPHEN O’HARE, IRISH COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, HEAR OUR VOICES: DEVELOP-
ING A MODEL FOR BEST PRACTICE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 10–
11 (June 20, 2012) available at http://www.iccl.ie/attachments/download/260/ICCL_%20Best%20
Practice%20for%20Constitutional%20Reform%2020%20June%202012%20FINAL.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8BTV-MEGB.  
 28 See generally Zachary Elkins et al., The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Con-
stitutional Approval, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. 361 (2008) (examining the link between public participa-
tion in constitutional promulgation and the contents of the constitutional text). 
 29 John M. Carey, Does It Matter How a Constitution is Created?, in IS DEMOCRACY EX-
PORTABLE? 155, 175–76 (Zoltan Barany & Robert G. Moser eds., 2009). 
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depends on who sits at the table to hammer out their provisions.”30 The 
more inclusive the process of drafting and negotiating constitutional con-
tent, the greater the benefits for democracy and constitutional stability.31 
Both the Icelandic and Irish constitutional conventions included additional 
and expanded avenues for popular initiative and oversight as well as in-
creased inclusiveness within their recommendations.32 
3. Constitutional Longevity 
There appears to be a correlation between “inclusion” during constitu-
tion-making and constitutional longevity.33 Empirical studies on constitu-
tional development identify “inclusion”—the breadth of participation in 
both formulating and subsequently enforcing constitutional agreements—as 
one of the key factors ensuring constitutional survival. 34  The common 
knowledge created when the constitution is publicly formulated and debated 
leads to an attachment to the constitutional project, resulting in self-
enforcement and longevity.35 The Icelandic convention and its 2011 draft 
constitution were initially thought to be a prime example of this process.36 
4. Democratic Renewal 
A final potential benefit of participatory constitutional change is its 
ability to combat the crisis of democracy by resorting to deliberative pro-
cesses.37 In an age where citizens feel detached from regular politics, delib-
erative forms of engagement may yet resurrect their interest.38 Some schol-
ars note that “[a]lthough electoral participation is generally declining, par-
ticipation is expanding into new forms of action,” with citizens seeking a 
more active role, “prepared to challenge (and thereby engage with) existing 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. at 177. 
 31 Id.  
 32See STJÓRNLAGARÁÐ [CONST. COUNCIL], A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR THE 
REPUBLIC OF ICELAND, arts. 15, 34, 65, 66, 84 (2011) (English trans.) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR A 
NEW CONSTITUTION], available at http://www.stjornlagarad.is/other_files/stjornlagarad/Frumvarp-
enska.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G6VJ-8FR7; CONV. ON THE CONST., NINTH REPORT OF THE 
CONVENTION ON THE CONSTITUTION: CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 24–26 (Mar. 
2014) (Ire.), available at https://www.constitution.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=55f2ba29-aab8-
e311-a7ce-005056a32ee4, archived at https://perma.cc/2R7U-ZLW6 [hereinafter IRISH CONST. 
CONV. RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 33 See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 78 (2009). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 78–79. 
 36 See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., A REVIEW OF ICELAND’S DRAFT CONSTITUTION 3 (2012), 
available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/CCP-Iceland-Report.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QA2Q-JHV9. 
 37 See Farrell et al., supra note 4, at 100. 
 38 Id. at 100–01. 
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systems and norms.”39 A “new model of democracy” is said to be evolving, 
one which requires more participation from its citizens.40 The financial cri-
sis served as the impetus for popular engagement and democratic innova-
tion in both Iceland and Ireland because of the citizenry’s lack of confi-
dence in more traditional paths.41 The advantages promised by deliberative 
democracy, such as creativity, openness and consensus-based (rather than 
adversarial) politics, were much more attractive when confronted with con-
stitutional failure and stale institutions.42 Moreover, there is no reason to 
consider this a trade-off because representative institutions can coexist with 
such innovations and may in fact be developed and improved.43 
5. Cautionary Notes 
The narrative centered on the benefits of increased participation in 
constitution-making requires at least one significant caveat: the considera-
tions presented above may have only limited relevance in societies emerg-
ing from conflict or where there are strong possibilities that the constitu-
tion-making process would be subverted.44 Opening up constitution-making 
in such post-conflict or fragile democracies might even have deleterious 
effects.45 At least one study indicates that the representativeness of constitu-
tional assemblies in post-conflict situations might not be very important.46 
Scholars have recently cautioned against idealizing constitution-making 
moments, noting that there is a real danger of unilateral exercises of power 
diverting the constitutional process in some contexts, and have argued for a 
preservative rather than transformative process. 47 These are valid concerns 
in need of further exploration. They alert us that the essentially positive, 
respectful and consensus-seeking nature of the Icelandic and Irish experi-
ences may have masked crucial preconditions for their respective success. 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. at 100 (citing RUSSELL J. DALTON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: HOW A YOUNGER GENER-
ATION IS RESHAPING AMERICAN POLITICS 274 (2d ed., 2009)). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. at 99; Saunders, supra note 16, at 8. 
 42 See, e.g., WE THE CITIZENS, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN ACTION—A PILOT 10–11 
(2011), available at http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/We-the-Citizens-
2011-FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6M9G-4D99 (arguing that the 2008 financial crisis 
in Ireland contributed to popular frustration with and rejection of current political system). 
 43 See id. at 13 (“[D]eliberative processes are not meant to replace representative or direct 
democracy, but to enhance and support it.”); see also Peter Vermeersch, Innovating Democracy in 
Times of Crisis: Solution or Utopia?, 4 OPEN CITIZENSHIP 66, 66 (2013).  
 44 See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 934 (2013); 
Widner, supra note 26, at 1529–33. 
 45 See Widner, supra note 26, at 1529–33. 
 46 See id. 
 47See Landau, supra note 44, at 925–27. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Constitutional Convention as a Mechanism of Constitution-Making 
Comparative legal work paints a complex picture of both the formal 
and informal tools used by countries around the world to achieve constitu-
tional reform.48 This is matched by political theorists who have tried to in-
corporate democratic innovations such as those discussed in this Essay into 
models of institutional design.49 While scholars have put forth typologies of 
participatory constitution-making instruments and distinguished between 
forms as disparate as constituent assemblies, round tables, constitutional 
conventions, and peace negotiations, this Essay will only analyze constitu-
tional conventions modeled on citizen assemblies.50 Such assemblies are by 
no means the sole mechanisms of participatory decision-making; rather, 
other devices include citizen juries, deliberative polls and participatory 
budgeting as well as dozens of additional participatory mechanisms. 51 
Among these, however, “citizen assemblies stand out as constituting the 
most extensive modern form of collective decision-making by common 
folk.”52 Moreover, these assemblies represent “the only method of citizen 
policymaking that combines all the following characteristics: a relatively 
large group of ordinary people, lengthy periods of learning and deliberation, 
and a collective decision with important political consequences for an entire 
political system.”53 Citizen assemblies effectively amount to “a litmus test 
for the consequences of deliberation.”54 
 Constitutional conventions of the type discussed here (termed by some 
scholars as “people’s conventions”) share several traits, including the cen-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See, e.g., THE CREATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS (Mads Adenas 
ed., 2000); ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EU-
ROPE, CANADA AND THE USA (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013); HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011). 
 49 See, e.g., GRAHAM SMITH, DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS: DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (2009) (reviewing different democratic innovations such as New England 
town meetings, citizen assemblies, direct legislation, “e-democracy,” and theorizing whether insti-
tutions can be designed to create opportunities for citizen engagement). 
 50 See Andrew Arato, Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models, Prin-
ciples and Elements of Democratic Constitution-Making, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 173, 
175–84 (2012); see also MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: 
SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 185–209 (2010) (discussing typologies of 
constitution-making more broadly); Jennifer Widner, Reform Models, CONST. WRITING & CON-
FLICT RESOL. PROJECT, http://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/drafting/models.html (last visited Mar. 
10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7N85-2MTU. 
 51 Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms, 30 SCI. 
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 251, 257 (2005). 
 52 FOURNIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10. 
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. at 13. 
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trality of quasi-randomly selected citizens tasked with deciding important 
constitutional reforms in a deliberative setting.55 According to one author, 
the common traits of such participatory constitutional conventions are that: 
(1) they “address big, national questions of constitutional/institutional de-
sign;” (2) they “are established by government to meet a certain objective in 
time-delimited fashion;” (3) they “deliberately and distinctly treated as a 
supplement (rather than competitor) to the existing system of representative 
democracy;” (4) they include ordinary citizens; (5) their “membership is 
based on random selection rather than election;” (6) the outcome of the de-
liberation is clear at the start of the process; (7) “the heart of the enterprise 
is deliberation.” 56 Some of these traits, however, are inherently problemat-
ic, as will be discussed below. Others have proven practically difficult to 
achieve, such as deliberations or the adequate selection of participants; 
while still others, such as the clarity of the ensuing process, are often only 
insufficiently fulfilled. 
B. The Constitutional Convention Enters the Digital Era 
1. Preliminaries: British Colombia, the Netherlands, and Ontario 
Before delving into constitutional reform in Iceland and Ireland, one 
must pause to acknowledge that, for all their purported novelty, these pro-
cesses were not completely original. Three antecedents are particularly rel-
evant and should be noted: the cases of British Columbia, the Netherlands, 
and Ontario. British Columbia offers an especially groundbreaking experi-
ment with citizen assemblies that provided a potential model for both the 
Netherlands and Ontario, and subsequently Iceland and Ireland. 57  There 
surely were marked differences with the Irish and Icelandic processes de-
tailed below, however, not least of all the fact that the three earlier examples 
were all aimed at affecting electoral reform and not far-reaching constitu-
tional change.58 Nevertheless, the three antecedents shared a commitment to 
participatory and deliberative democracy aimed at “inject[ing] some popu-
lar legitimacy into policymaking.” 59 The three original case studies also 
offer important lessons in regard to citizen assemblies because each country 
ultimately failed to bring about their desired change: the two Canadian cas-
                                                                                                                           
 55 Farrell, supra note 3, at 194–95. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See FOURNIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse, Introduction: 
Democratic Renewal and Deliberative Democracy, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY 1, 1 n.1 (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 
2008). 
 58 Warren & Pearse, supra note 57, at 1. 
 59 See FOURNIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 17–18 (explaining rationale for engaging citizen 
assemblies in British Columbia, the Netherlands, and Ontario). 
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es experienced unsuccessful referendums due to high thresholds, while the 
Dutch case saw major political changes deprive its proposed changes of 
support. 60  Lessons afforded by these three examples relate to the im-
portance of momentum behind desired changes, the selection of partici-
pants, and of the process of giving effect to proposals, especially in relation 
to a referendum.61 A general warning informed by these three cases reminds 
us that “[a] citizen assembly is an expensive instrument that ought to be 
used sparingly, and under exceptional circumstances.”62 
2. The Icelandic Process 
Iceland’s constitutional reformation attempt arose in the aftermath of 
the country’s 2008 financial crash and the resulting so-called “pots and 
pans” revolution. 63 Calls for constitutional change had existed for some 
time but had never gained much traction.64 Indeed, “the new Icelandic re-
public never autonomously wrote a constitution to match the independent 
state.”65 At the time of its adoption, the 1944 constitution focused on ending 
the Danish monarchy but was otherwise largely a copy of the 1874 constitu-
tion (itself a copy of the 1849 Danish constitution).66 The 1944 document 
had initially been understood as transitory, prompting calls for setting up a 
constitutional convention as early as 1948.67 Constitutional politics dictated 
otherwise, however, and the constitution survived without major overhaul, 
with the pace of amendment only picking up in the 1970s.68 Iceland’s Prime 
Minister (as of 2009), Jóhanna Sigurdardóttir, formerly a Member of Par-
liament, had fought for years to institute a total constitutional review.69 On 
November 4, 2009, she tabled a bill in Parliament concerning the estab-
lishment of an advisory Constitutional Assembly.70 One should note, how-
ever, that there were still voices questioning the wisdom of engaging in 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 18. 
 61 See id. at 17–18. 
 62 Id. at 155. 
 63 See Anne Meuwese, Popular Constitution-Making: The Case of Iceland, in SOCIAL & PO-
LITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 469, 472 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 
2013); Landemore, supra note 3, at 7. 
 64 See Meuwese, supra note 63, at 473.  
 65 Bergsson & Blokker, supra note 23, at 155. 
 66 See Meuwese, supra note 63, at 473. 
 67 See id.; Ágúst Thór Árnason, A Review of the Icelandic Constitution—Popular Sovereignty 
or Political Confusion, 2011 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT [J. CONST. LAW] 342, 
346 (2011).  
 68 See Árnason, supra note 67, at 345–46. 
 69 Id. at 342. 
 70 See The Constitutional Council Hands Over the Bill for a New Constitution, STJÓRNLAGA-
RÁÐ [CONST. COUNCIL] (July 29, 2011), http://www.stjornlagarad.is/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/4H3S-3HZB?type=source [hereinafter Council Hands Over the Bill]. 
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constitutional overhaul during a time of crisis and by means outside the tra-
ditional legislative route.71 
The Icelandic constitution’s narrative as the world’s first 
“crowdsourced constitution” typically begins with the first National Forum, 
which was organized by the grassroots organization, “the Anthill,” in No-
vember 2009.72 Under the slogan “National Assembly: A Date with the Fu-
ture,” this was “a one-day exercise that consisted of articulating the values 
and priorities that should guide the renewal of government and public ad-
ministration.”73 The forum was made up of 1,200 randomly selected citi-
zens and 300 representatives of interest groups and institutions, which were 
divided into 162 tables.74 They were instructed to discuss and agree on Ice-
landic societal values, which would ultimately be made public.75 In June 
2010, Iceland passed the Act on a Constitutional Assembly No. 90/2010.76 It 
provided for the creation of a twenty-five to thirty-one member advisory 
Constitutional Assembly (later Council) whose task was to produce a bill 
for submission to Parliament, indicating changes to the constitution within a 
three to four month period.77 The act also provided for the establishment of 
a Constitutional Committee, which would prepare a second National Fo-
rum, a report based on the latter’s results, and a collection of materials rele-
vant to the future Constitutional Assembly.78 The second National Forum 
was held in November 2010.79 Approximately 950 quasi-randomly selected 
citizens participated.80 The report constituted the starting point for the de-
liberation of the Constitutional Convention.81 Despite attempts to the con-
trary, the Forum was only partially representative (mostly due to age and 
geographic representation, though not gender) and there was a strong ele-
ment of self-selection in its composition.82 
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Elections to the Constitutional Assembly were held in October 2010, 
with 522 candidates standing for election.83 A hurdle relating to the elec-
tion’s legitimacy soon followed, when a successful request for invalidation 
of the elections was brought before Iceland’s Supreme Court.84 Despite this 
ruling, a parliamentary resolution was adopted in March 2011 appointing 
the twenty-five delegates originally elected to the Assembly.85 Their task 
was to make recommendations for constitutional change, taking the Consti-
tutional Committee’s report as their starting point.86 The 700-page report 
was presented in April 2011, the official starting date of the Council.87 The 
Council soon agreed on their rules of procedure and divided into three 
working groups.88 The groups sought to both inform the public of its pro-
gress, as well as to have the public participate and make suggestions as dis-
cussions progressed (including on platforms such as, Facebook, Twitter, 
Flickr, and YouTube).89 For this purpose, the groups set up various social 
media platforms.90 Meeting schedules and minutes were also posted online, 
and the Council’s website was updated with news and a weekly newslet-
ter.91 Advertisements encouraging the public to get involved in the process 
were also published in the media.92 By the end of the Council’s work, the 
public had made some 360 proposals and more than 3,600 comments on the 
available platforms.93 
The Constitutional Council sought unanimity in adopting the bill it de-
livered to Parliament in July 2011.94 The Council focused on a few main 
themes, including transparency, responsibility, and the distribution of pow-
er, which were reflected in its draft.95 The most radical provisions were Ar-
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ticle 65, which stipulated that “[t]en percent of voters may demand a na-
tional referendum on laws passed by Althingi,” and Article 66, which stated 
that “[t]wo percent of voters may present an issue to Althingi.”96 Commen-
taries on the draft constitution have noted that “[o]ne of the most salient 
features of the Icelandic Constitutional Bill is its open approach to the direct 
participation of citizens, through referendums, in government business and 
legislation.”97 The Venice Commission was more ambivalent in its appraisal 
of the draft, noting the lack of clarity and of necessary technical detail in 
direct democracy provisions.98 Others regretted that such a radical process 
of constitution-making did not result in “a radically participatory form of 
democracy in constitutional terms.”99 Nonetheless, the draft was also met 
with enthusiasm by many who believed “that Iceland’s [draft] constitution 
[came] in as one of the most inclusive in history and well-above the mean 
of contemporary constitutions.”100 
A successful referendum followed on October 20, 2012.101 Six ques-
tions were posed, including: “[d]o you wish the Constitution Council’s pro-
posals to form the basis of a new draft Constitution?” and, “[w]ould you 
like to see a provision in the new Constitution stating that a certain propor-
tion of the electorate is able to demand that issues be put to a referen-
dum?”102 Sixty-seven and seventy-three percent of voters answered yes to 
these two questions, respectively.103 The wording of the first question, in 
particular, posed problems in determining the precise status of the draft 
constitution and the extent to which Parliament could modify it.104 Despite 
welcoming the results of the (advisory) referendum, political parties were 
unable to fully consider the draft before the general elections in April 
2013.105 The bill had been discussed twice in Parliament before another bill 
was passed in March 2013, which effectively postponed the third and final 
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discussion for after the elections.106 This latter bill proposed a new proce-
dure to amend the constitution by 2017, combining legislative initiatives 
and a threshold referendum.107 During the general elections, the constitution 
was not a high priority for voters and, although all parties agreed that con-
stitutional change was necessary, support for a completely new constitution 
had waned.108 
3. The Irish Process 
The Irish constitution, the first adopted by popular vote, has been 
amended several times since its implementation in 1937. 109 Such amend-
ments have been effectuated through its formal amendment procedure via a 
referendum of all qualified voters.110 Recent calls for constitutional change 
stemmed from demands for “more efficient control and accountability of pub-
lic bodies, and the slimming down of the public sector and its emoluments” in 
the aftermath of the country’s economic downturn and from the desire to have 
a text that better reflects present day understandings of good government.111 
Such context set forth plans for a constitutional convention to take place dur-
ing 2016, the centenary of the Easter Rising against British Rule.112 
Ireland’s current reform process began in late 2009 and early 2010, 
when the Parliament Joint Committee on the Constitution debated the need 
for electoral reform.113 The Committee report, issued in July 2010, pro-
posed the establishment of a citizen assembly to consider this question.114 
Major political parties in Ireland shared this concern for constitutional 
change, including the Fine Gael and the Labour Party, the two parties that 
would form the governing coalition following the 2011 elections.115 The 
2011–2016 Programme for Government indicated a Constitutional Conven-
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tion would be established “to consider comprehensive constitutional re-
form” on seven major issues and over the span of twelve months.116 It was 
to produce a report by the end of that period, but nothing else was men-
tioned regarding its membership or procedures.117 
A notable development occurred in the midst of this legislative action, 
whereby a group of academics, inspired by other recent experiments with 
citizen assemblies, set up the “We the Citizens” initiative.118 The group’s 
“aim was to demonstrate the virtue of deliberative approaches by holding 
[its] own (pilot) citizen assembly.”119 The experiment took place in June 
2011, when one hundred randomly selected citizens from all sectors of Irish 
society were given expert information and the opportunity to deliberate on 
particular policy issues.120 The report on the initiative concluded that “de-
liberation works” and recommended that the government adopt a citizen 
assembly to complement its representative institutions.121 This seemed to 
contradict critics of constitutional conventions, who thought Ireland was too 
different or unique for citizen assemblies to work there.122 The architects of 
“We the Citizens” have also speculated that the project 
was influential in the move by the government to finally—albeit 
18 months later than envisaged—launch the Constitutional Con-
vention, as well as in the decision over how it should be com-
prised (notably the decision to increase the citizen membership to 
two-thirds of the total and to dispense with expert members) and 
how it should operate, namely along deliberative lines.123 
The Parliament passed a resolution in July 2012 establishing the terms 
for the convention. It was to consist of one hundred members, including:  
a Chairperson to be appointed by the Government, 66 citizens enti-
tled to vote at a referendum, randomly selected so as to be broadly 
representative of Irish society, a member of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly from each of the political parties in the Assembly which 
accepts an invitation from the Government; and members of the 
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Houses of the Oireachtas, so as to be impartially representative of 
the Houses.124  
The Convention sought to produce reports on each of the issues listed in its 
terms of reference, but was not limited thereto and could also propose, after 
the completion of the former reports, “such other relevant constitutional 
amendments” as it deemed fit.125 Additionally, the Convention was to set its 
own rules of procedure and install a majority voting system, where the 
chairperson would cast a vote in case of deadlock.126 Importantly, the gov-
ernment committed to respond to the Convention’s reports within four 
months and to further indicate a time frame for submitting accepted rec-
ommendations for a referendum.127 Initial controversy surrounding the ano-
nymity of its citizen-members was swiftly resolved when the representa-
tives agreed to renounce it at the first meeting of the Convention.128 
The Constitutional Convention held its first meeting on December 1, 
2012 and was to run no later than March 31, 2014, after extending its man-
date from the original twelve months.129 The Convention considered and 
made recommendations on all seven listed items.130 Of these, the govern-
ment responded to four as of the time of writing of this Essay (September 
2014) including: changes to the President’s term of office, reducing the vot-
ing age, changes to the clause on women in the home, and the legalization 
of same-sex marriage.131 In three of these (reducing the voting age; reduc-
ing the age of candidacy for Presidential elections; and same sex marriage), 
the response indicated that referendums on these issues would be held in 
2015.132 By July 2014, however, there were delays in the government’s re-
sponse to the Convention’s subsequent reports.133 A further motion for abol-
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ishing the Seanad (the Irish Senate) was referred to the Convention in June 
2012, but the Convention voted to not consider the matter.134 The Conven-
tion invited further submissions on the listed items, including proposals 
from Irish citizens living abroad.135 It received thousands of submissions, 
especially on the more controversial issues such as same-sex marriage and 
the relationship between church and state.136 The Convention also requested 
public input on items to add to its agenda, and held specific regional meet-
ings from October to November 2013 for this purpose.137 Accordingly, two 
more issues were chosen: Dáil (lower house) reform and economic, social 
and cultural rights.138 The Convention also uploaded its work product onto 
its website and made use of social media, notably Facebook, YouTube and 
Twitter.139 
Given the timely completion of its task, as well as its transparent work-
ing method, the Irish Constitutional Convention has received generally fa-
vorable reviews to date.140 As one observer mentioned, “Ireland’s Constitu-
tional Convention has delivered.” 141  Individuals from civil society were 
permitted to provide input via presentations before the Convention.142 Re-
gardless, some civil society organizations criticized the Convention on sev-
eral grounds, lamenting the lack of avenues for their direct participation in 
the process.143 Such organizations also feared the random selection mecha-
nism would end up excluding marginalized groups, which was particularly 
disconcerting given their centrality to some of the issues up for considera-
tion by the Convention (same-sex marriage, reducing the voting age, the 
status of women et cetera.).144 They further expressed doubt that a small 
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group of inexperienced and non-representative participants, likely intimi-
dated by their politician colleagues, could “meaningfully be said to repre-
sent the population.” 145 The latter point, on the impact of politician in-
volvement, is seen as a positive by other commentators, who argue that the 
modus operandi of the Convention ensured equal opportunity among mem-
bers.146 It could also “prove useful in helping to minimize the risks of a 
‘disconnect’ between the Convention and the political class” as in Canada, 
the Netherlands, and now Iceland.147  
The Convention’s agenda has also been criticized for being too limited, 
with the list of issues too restrictive and not fundamental enough.148 Others 
have claimed, however, that the non-exhaustive nature of the issue list and 
its freedom to interpret its brief liberally mitigated such concerns.149 Indeed, 
it appears the Convention has provided such a liberal construction on at 
least two occasions: in recommending the voting age of sixteen instead of 
seventeen, as it had initially been asked to consider, and in recommending 
to give citizens a direct role in the process of nominating presidential candi-
dates, issues arguably entirely beyond its mandate.150 
Another criticism, and one which echoes the Icelandic experience, was 
that the government maintained the final word on any reform recommenda-
tions.151 Some have claimed this was at least mitigated by the latter’s com-
mitment to responding to Convention recommendations in a timely man-
ner.152 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Constitutional Convention’s work 
was far more constrained in scope, at least from the point of view of issues 
considered, than that of the Constitutional Council in Iceland.153 The inher-
ent differences between a process aimed at drafting an entirely new consti-
tution and one that considers reforms piecemeal, also played a differentiat-
ing role.154 Indeed, some have praised precisely this aspect of the Irish pro-
cess as having ensured its relative success: submitting constitutional chang-
es to government review and possibly popular referendum one at a time 
helped avoid blockage of the process.155 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Lessons from the Iceland and Ireland Processes 
The two innovative processes presently discussed offer several lessons 
for participatory constitution-making in the digital age: 
1. Inclusiveness Will Always Be Imperfect 
One lesson has to do with the inclusiveness of the endeavor. In Iceland 
this was 
aimed at, and partially achieved, through three different and com-
plementary methods: (i) direct popular participation at various 
stages of the process, (ii) elements of descriptive representativeness 
where direct participation wasn’t possible, and (iii) transparency. 
All three aspects arguably combined to ensure not just procedural 
legitimacy, but also some degree of epistemic reliability.156 
The three elements combined—participation, representativeness and 
transparency—form a complex notion of inclusiveness, reaching beyond the 
mere sum of its parts.157 Iceland and Ireland achieved each element to vary-
ing degrees. 
Iceland’s progression from a large National Forum purposefully de-
signed with increased representativeness to a Constitutional Council seek-
ing to widely publicize its work and accommodate all public interventions 
to a referendum on the draft constitution was indeed an impressive under-
taking.158 The process contained design flaws, however, including issues 
regarding its implementation at various phases, which should encourage 
caution for any future initiatives.159 Such missteps included: the structure 
and procedures of the National Forum not being participatory; the lack of 
consultation on how to proceed following the Supreme Court’s invalidation 
of elections to the Constitutional Assembly; the role played by the Constitu-
tional Committee in preparing the report on the results of the second Na-
tional Forum; the lack of discussion (outside Parliament) of the selection 
process for the Constitutional Assembly; and the allotted time for the Con-
stitutional Council to finish its work (three months with one month exten-
sion) as arbitrary and insufficient.160 
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Even where the process was distinctly inclusive, shortcomings re-
mained. For example, the Constitutional Council provided transcripts of 
only its open meetings which due to weeks’ delays were “too late for an 
immediate feedback loop to take place between the Council and the crowd 
members willing to read the transcripts.”161 Furthermore, the Council pro-
vided “irregular, informal, and limited” feedback to the suggestions re-
ceived from the public, possibly due to the lack of resources and institution-
alization of feedback-giving. 162  The extent of citizen involvement also 
seems problematic, as evidenced by insufficient involvement and the small 
number of comments proffered by the older and less technologically-savvy 
citizenry.163 It is worth noting that the extent to which this truly was an in-
stance of “crowdsourcing” a constitution is also questionable. The Constitu-
tional Council clarified its role, stating at one point during the process that, 
“the phase we are now in should be called an exercise in open democracy 
and transparency rather than crowdsourcing.”164 The drafting process was 
not itself an instance of crowdsourcing—or the “commons-based peer pro-
duction” used in writing Wikipedia articles, for instance.165 The “crowd” 
did not write the constitution, although it had ways of influencing the pro-
cess.166 
Similar shortcomings also existed in the Irish context. As already not-
ed, civil society organizations voiced strong objections to not being directly 
included in the Constitutional Convention.167 They feared the representa-
tiveness of the process would be lacking, given that marginalized groups 
were not explicitly included, even though pertinent issues concerned them 
directly.168 This latter point exposes a potential weakness of the statistical 
notion of representativeness typically used when selecting participants for 
citizen assemblies.169 This form of representativeness aims to mirror society 
as closely as possible, especially with respect to gender, age and geograph-
ical representation.170 The fundamental character of the issues involved in 
constitutional reform processes and their often divisive nature, however, 
may require an alternative idea of representativeness—for example, one 
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based on providing a voice to all those whose interests are affected. This is 
especially relevant for marginalized groups relating to sexual orientation or 
other minorities, whose rights have increasingly come under constitutional 
scrutiny in recent years in countries such as Ireland.171  
Finally, such concerns echo criticisms of other forms of direct democ-
racy, particularly referendums. 172 The “majoritarian danger” objection to 
referendums is based on the fear that “they represent a model of majoritari-
an decision-making that imperils the interests of dissenting individuals and 
minorities.” 173  With referendums, the main source of this danger is the 
mode of decision-making itself; however, the potential for outcomes that 
are not representative of all societal views is relevant to constitutional con-
ventions as well.174 
2. Expert Involvement Should Be Handled with Care 
A related lesson deals with the role experts are to play in the process. 
As previously noted, Iceland’s Constitutional Committee, a body of ap-
pointed experts, had a significant impact on the drafting process. They 
summarized and added to the results of the second National Forum, as well 
as advising the Constitutional Council.175 Moreover, lawyers were included 
to help reword passages in the constitutional draft with a view to ensure 
consistency and compatibility with Iceland’s international treaties.176 Their 
work in some instances exceeded mere rewording, but rather amounted to 
an alteration of substance and the meaning of certain provisions.177 Despite 
disagreement from some members of the Constitutional Council over the 
role of these lawyers, “they ultimately did not (or could not) question their 
changes, and a public justification for these changes was never issued.”178 
In Ireland, experts were also involved in the Constitutional Conven-
tion, though less directly.179 They gave presentations on the issues under 
consideration by the Convention.180 The expert’s contributions were then 
made public in the Convention’s reports.181 Moreover, the “We the Citi-
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zens” initiative, which was entirely academic-led, may have influenced the 
type of constitutional convention created in Ireland. Ireland’s Constitutional 
Convention may have been purposefully designed so as to keep the experts’ 
role in check, a recommendation long made by theorists of deliberative de-
mocracy and constitution-making.182 
3. The Outcome of the Process Should Be Clear from the Outset 
The Icelandic and Irish constitution-making processes provide a fur-
ther lesson on the importance of process design and clarity of outcome. De-
spite its common perception as a significant victory for direct democracy, 
the Icelandic draft bill and successful referendum were followed by a near 
standstill in what appears to be a failure to effect constitutional renewal.183 
Part of the criticism levied at the process has pointed to the advisory nature 
of the referendum, which may have resulted in bias that pervaded the Con-
stitutional Council’s work.184 More significant, this Essay argues, is the crit-
icism that it was unclear what would happen to the draft post-referendum: 
“while the October 2012 referendum has shown sizable civic support, [it] at 
the same time left important questions open.”185 There was uncertainty as to 
whether the draft could be amended.186 Moreover, the very wording of the 
first referendum question created confusion regarding the status of the 
draft.187 The choice of mechanism for implementing recommendations is an 
important one and referendums carry their own set of challenges when used 
in constitution-making.188 
The Irish process was comparatively clearer because all parties knew 
from the outset that the government would have the final word on authoriz-
ing constitutional reform.189 The Irish government alone would decide on 
the appropriate manner to respond to the Constitutional Convention’s rec-
ommendations.190 Such government discretion aligns with scholarly obser-
vations that political elites will adopt mechanisms such as citizen assem-
blies on serious matters, but will “make sure that change does not come too 
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easily, and that they can, if necessary, block an unpalatable reform.” 191 
There is a link here with the “elite-control syndrome” associated with refer-
endums, which is further discussed below. 
4. Political Actors Should Not Be Alienated 
The case studies also demonstrate the importance of not alienating the 
political actors who have a role in deciding the fate of the process.192 This 
point is made in light of the apparent failure of Iceland’s process after popular 
involvement ended and the new draft constitution reached the Icelandic Par-
liament.193 Scholars note that “[a] strong emphasis on civic-driven constitu-
tional politics appears to have ‘alienated’ parliament as well as part of the 
academic community from the process.”194 Perhaps it was such considera-
tions that led Ireland to also include politicians in its experiment with popular 
participation in constitution-making.195 That said, a balance between not al-
ienating elites and having them overtake the entire process might be difficult 
to strike.196 In the case of referendums, concerns of the latter type have been 
referred to as “elite-control syndrome,” which encapsulates the fear “that 
elites can dominate the process of referendums in such a way as to procure a 
particular result.”197 The charge is not that elites are involved in the process of 
referendum decision-making at all, “but rather that these elites are able to ex-
ploit their role for narrow political advantage.”198 In the Irish case, for exam-
ple, there was reticence from the outset regarding the government’s control of 
the outcome, including whether to submit the Convention’s recommendations 
to referendums.199 Likewise, in Iceland, it was legislative elites who ultimate-
ly decided to renounce constitutional overhaul, despite the complex process 
previously set in motion to draft a new constitution.200 
5. The Deliberative Promise Should Not Be Overstated 
A final lesson from the two cases deals with their deliberative promise. 
The Icelandic process’s inclusive nature has already been called into ques-
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tion, with Ireland facing similar misgivings as well.201 Despite experiment-
ing with large forums aimed at inclusiveness, the innovative use of social 
media, and attempts to increase citizen participation in the drafting process, 
the deliberative credentials of the two processes are problematic.202 A full 
evaluation of deliberative practices in these two cases reaches beyond the 
scope of this Essay. Briefly, however, there is one strand of criticism fo-
cused on the procedures of the constitutional conventions themselves.203 In 
Iceland, much of the participation from the public came in the form of 
statements rather than deliberation. 204 In Ireland, too, despite a citizen’s 
ability to make submissions to the Convention on what issues to consider, it 
remained unclear to what extent public input made a difference. 205 The 
Convention’s procedural rules also indicated that decisions would be by a 
majority, with the appointed chairperson maintaining the last vote in case of 
a tie—a departure from the consensus-seeking procedures of the Icelandic 
Constitutional Council.206 
Most importantly, in both cases, the final word was not vested in the 
citizenry or even the constitutional convention, but rather with the political 
elites.207 This has led critics to question the meaningfulness of such pro-
cesses and to ultimately conclude that “the communicative efforts of the 
general public remain in the form of weak publics belonging to the cultural 
public spheres since decision-making still takes place in the ‘upper’ struc-
tures of political public spheres.”208 Such views serve to counterbalance the 
more optimistic praise for popular involvement and the embrace of social 
media, particularly in Iceland.209 These views also resonate with wider con-
cerns of direct democracy, such as the “deliberative deficit” objection to ref-
erendums.210 The objection is that “referendums by their nature facilitate or 
indeed encourage the mere aggregation of individual wills and in doing so fail 
to foster either the acquisition of information by or the active deliberation of, 
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citizens.”211 Similar considerations of decision-making, which should go be-
yond mere aggregation, are relevant to the inner workings of constitutional 
conventions. Interestingly, to the extent that consensus was sought, notably in 
Iceland’s Constitutional Council, it was done for strategic reasons, such as to 
maximize the likelihood of later legislative support, and was not institutional-
ized in the procedural rules of the body. 
B. Principles of Participatory Constitution-Making Good Practice:  
A Preliminary Sketch 
The aforementioned lessons, based on shortcomings identified in the two 
cases, form the basis for a set of principles to guide constitution-making by 
way of participatory constitutional conventions.  
1. Inclusiveness 
Inclusiveness should be aimed at (1) achieving representativeness; (2) 
maintaining responsiveness at all stages; and (3) ensuring oversight. It can 
be achieved by (1) quasi-random selection of participants; (2) participation 
in important stages of decision-making, and (3) transparency. 
2. Clarity of Process 
Clarity should be aimed at expectation adjustment and strategic posi-
tioning. Strategic positioning refers to participants having an opportunity to 
adopt strategies aimed at the final success of the constitution-making en-
deavor. An example would be managing resource allocation so as to cover 
not just constitutional conventions, but also subsequent referendums or po-
litical elections on which the implementation of the convention’s recom-
mendations would ultimately depend. Clarity can be achieved by advance 
notice of the steps and fate of the outcome.  
3. Involvement of All Relevant Actors 
Involvement of all relevant actors is aimed at avoiding alienation and 
ensuring public ownership. It can be achieved by involving both political 
elites and interested parties.  
4. Equality as Parity of Esteem 
Equality as parity of esteem can be achieved by responsible and trans-
parent decision-making procedures and is important for the aim of facilitat-
ing true deliberation.212 
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5. Consensus-Based Decision-Making 
Consensus-based decision-making is necessary to avoid mere aggrega-
tion of preferences and to facilitate true deliberation.213 It can be achieved 
by creating consensus-seeking decision-making procedures at the outset of 
the process. 
The five principles mix procedural and substantive considerations and 
are aimed at achieving a truly participatory, and as much as possible, deliber-
ative process of constitution-making. The underlying premises are that real 
participation must reach beyond mere inclusion at various stages of the con-
stitution-making process, that the process’s outcome is significant, and that 
decision-making procedures employed throughout matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal of participatory constitutional conventions and citizen as-
semblies is unlikely to fade soon. It is tied to a sustained dissatisfaction with 
traditional avenues of constitution-making and might be part of a larger 
movement towards informal or at least not yet formalized methods of consti-
tutional change. While one might not speak of a “unified movement”214 of 
citizen-centered approaches just yet, there is a clear demonstration effect be-
tween the cases where they have emerged. Moreover, there are calls for ex-
ploring the potential of participatory constitutional conventions in countries 
undergoing important constitutional changes, such as the United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, caution is needed before venturing down this route. Post-
conflict and fragile democracies might not offer the requisite fertile ground 
for such mechanisms. Furthermore, by focusing on the few case studies avail-
able, there is a danger of ignoring context-specific aspects that likely had sig-
nificant bearing on the success of participatory processes there. The relevance 
of Ireland’s pattern of public consultation on important matters and Iceland’s 
general rule that constitutional change be based on consensus or unanimity215 
cannot be assessed without additional cases. Their small population size, so-
cietal homogeneity, high availability of technology, and recent experiences 
with acute economic crises also impacted the success of their experiments 
with constitutional conventions. Thus, if “the setting in which assemblies ex-
ist may undo all the good they are able to achieve,” future architects of partic-
ipatory constitutional conventions would do well to keep their compatibility 
with a country’s constitutional culture in mind.216 
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